Un Mandated Peace Keeping Operation In Afghanistan: A Dangerous Proposition For India
By
K Mohan
There have been reports emanating from Afghanistan that Taliban Higher Leadership have agreed to a proposal by Taliban Rank and file for only a reduction in violence and not a total ceasefire. However the Afghan politicians and the US main negotiator Ambassador Khalilzad have a demand for signing a total peace deal. Outline of the US withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and subsequent dialogues with the government in Kabul calls for a total and complete cease fire.
There have also been reports suggesting that the Afghanistan’s National Security Advisor, Hamdullah Mohib has placed a request for a Indian Division or at least a Brigade for peace keeping role possibly under UN led multinational framework.
India has traditionally contributed its troops in various UN mandated deployments essentially for peace keeping roles. We presently have contributed troops in South Sudan and in DR Congo among the many such deployments undertaken in various global hotspots in the past. This deployment, if it comes about would be very different from the past and would come with complexities which could turn the whole initiative into a disaster unless fully thought through.
Before India thinks of deploying or participating under a UN flag it is necessary to understand how the peace accord, once signed would pan out, given the competing goals and objectives of the various players involved. The US administration and the Afghan government would also be looking at drawing certain red lines which necessarily may be needed to ensure a certain modicum of success and to ensure the country does not spiral into a civil conflict based on ethnic lines.
To begin with, there is a need to understand the likely outcome desired by Taliban and by extension Pakistan’s desired end game. This is critical as we do not see Taliban and Pakistan compromising on their shared goals when dealing with the US or the government in Kabul. The Haqqanis have virtually taken over the leadership of Taliban with Sirajuddin Haqqanni taking over as the operational head based out of Quetta and his brother heading the Peshawar Shura.
The Haqqanis, in fact, the elder Haqqani had begun their close association with Pakistan’s ISI during the struggle against the Russians in the early 80’s and ever since the bond has only grown stronger. The earlier American deal with Taliban, facilitated by Pakistan, for release of two professors kidnapped from the Kabul University was also essentially agreed upon by the Taliban. This was to get one of the younger Haqqanis brothers released apart from some other senior Haqqanni functionaries who were held by the Afghan government. Given the present power equations within the group, its very less likely that other senior leaders in the Taliban which includes Mullah Akhunzada and Mullah Biradar would craft an independent peace pathway with the USA and the Afghan Government, other than the one orchestrated by Pakistan and enforced by the Haqqanis.
The Haqqanis have been principally responsible for a number of extremely violent suicide attacks including the one targeting the Indian Embassy in July 2010. With them at the helm of affairs within the Taliban, it is extremely improbable that any olive branch if extended by the Taliban to India for any dialogue would have any sincerity attached to it.
The Talibans would surely like all discussions with the Afghan government, which is one of the requirements being spoken about in the eventual peace accord, from a position of strength. They do control a large swathe of territory where their writ runs. Also given the fact that there is serious discord within the Afghan government on how to conduct negotiations, all functionaries tend to be pulling in different directions and not speak as one unified central authority. The Taliban would aim to dissolve the present government and have an interim government with all major portfolios under them and over time plan to extend their hold over the entire country and establish their vision of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. To enable this Emirate, they will not agree to disband their militia and this in itself will lead to tensions with the Afghan National Army which has a preponderance of personnel other than Pashtuns.
Pakistan would be very happy with such an outcome as this would allow them to have a major control over the government formed in Kabul and at the same time ensure that all other regional players have limited or no role in Afghanistan. This will not only help in their eternal quest for strategic depth against India but also reduce India’s influence on their Western border.
The geo political developments in the region also do not give very positive indications with regional players not setting aside their parochial interests for a stable and lasting peace in Afghanistan. There have been reports that Russia and China have made separate deals with the Taliban, even arming them, an accusation made by Afghan government officials, so as to secure themselves against attacks from Muslim fundamentalists in their respective restive regions. US –Iran recent tensions have only added to the confusion with the Mashhad council of the Taliban backing Iran and thus they may not necessarily support a US driven peace accord with the Taliban.
Given these circumstances, a peace deal with the Afghan government is at best going to be very fragile. It will be only prudent to assume that tensions between the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would be high. Each side will be trying to dominate outcomes, if necessary even by violent means during the implementation phase of the accord once signed. All this could easily break up into a sectarian strife based on ethnicity with the warlords in the North and the West still retaining a large number of armed followers.
As learnt from past experience of some select UN mandated operations in Angola, Sudan and DR Congo, the troop contributions for such missions have been mainly from third world countries but in the case of Afghanistan we could expect contributions from both Russia and China due to their involvement in the region. In the recent past China has been increasing their contributions to UN missions. The expectation from the UN troops would be to set up bases in strongholds of both the opponents and subsequently maintain peace by dialogue and armed presence and certainly not by physically enforcing it unless specifically mandated. The troop contributing countries would also if agreed upon, work on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). This of course in Afghanistan is fraught with dangers as the DDR and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Project (DIAG) projects undertaken after the Bonn agreement to disarm the Northern Alliance militia and warlords was not entirely successful. This would get more complicated in this case as the Taliban would definitely not agree to disarm even if the Afghan national army is restructured or dissolved and a new structure is planned to be established accommodating fighters from the Taliban. They are far too independent and dependent on the lucrative drug trade to either hand over their weapons or join the main stream National Army.
A UN mandated peace keeping force if deployed will only remain locked up in their bases protecting their own personnel and assets, as they will not have the will to enforce peace between warring factions and certainly no stomach to fight for a cause that would need a lot of explaining in the event of casualties to their constituents back home. Also Peace enforcement missions unless led by US and other European countries have hardly had any success even when deployed. In any case their deployment in Afghanistan since 2001 has not led to any success in eliminating or reducing Taliban’s influence.
In addition to all the above factors, in case of an Indian deployment, it would be seen as a party to the conflict with a clear bias to the present Afghan government and the ANSF, whom they have been providing training at select military institutes in India and have also been involved in improving their war fighting capability by provisioning of aircrafts and weapons.
There are also many Indian strategist who claim that any ungoverned spaces especially in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, a possibility if the peace accord were to fail, l would lead to providing an incubator not in a technological sense but as a safe haven for recruitment and training of Al Qaeda, LET, Jaish and other terrorists from CAR republics making us very vulnerable to attacks from these safe sanctuaries.
India would therefore need to reflect on all the geo political developments in the region, competing agendas of the regional players and then carry out a detailed analysis of the strategic gains from such involvement before committing itself to any future peace keeping role in Afghanistan. To keep our options open, we should look at deploying Special Forces advisors to support the Afghan commando Corp and their Commando Training school based in Kabul. This would be in line with earlier requests from the Afghan Government and US administration and they would be the key in providing inputs for a subsequent deployment of an Indian Brigade or Division if approved or agreed upon by the Indian government for a contribution towards a UN mandated peace keeping force.
