Mavericks of Chittagong
With 53 years down the line, it is high time that these mavericks of Chittagong are made to enter formally the military history books of our country, thereby giving long standing credit due to them that has been denied all along
By Colonel Satish Singh Lalotra
Armies the world over are replete with dozens of examples in various wars when the only hope to redeem their power and prestige in a crucial battle flowed out of the raw courage, doggedness and fortitude as exhibited by the troops on ground and not hinged on the high flying stratagems woven around by their commanders. There comes a time in every war when the cliffhanger had to be got over by the sheer weight of the uncanny attributes of few mavericks (read guerillas) who dared to enter the lair of the enemy unmindful of the dangers that lay ahead. Indian military’s accounts are no different in this regard with various engagements with our arch enemies since 1947 detailing myriad operations where such daredevilry per se acquitted itself with a resounding crescendo emanating from the barrels of such mavericks.
With the country all set to ring 53rd anniversary of the liberation war of 1971 on 16 December 2024, isn’t it time to ruffle through the pages of military history of our country and insert few paragraphs of velour and sheer doggedness displayed by these mavericks of our armed forces, that seem to have been consigned to oblivion either due to design or default? One such act of superhuman heroism, foresight and leadership of the highest order that has gone unnoticed has been the role of guerrillas of SFF (Special frontier force) in the unforgiving land of Chittagong, East Pakistan ( now Bangladesh) in the liberation war of 1971.
My impetus to write this article stemmed from the fact that I have had the opportunity to serve with these mavericks (SFF) way back in 1993 on deputation and saw them from close quarters both in peace and operations. But the latest catalyst to write came recently in the form of eastern corner of our sub-continent viz Chittagong in Bangladesh which rose on the mental firmament of Indians for all the wrong reasons i.e. wide spread persecution of Hindus in the after math of attack cum imprisonment of ISKON priest and has now got ominous portends for the entire sub-continent. Not only this, Chittagong was the specific place that drew attention of Indian security experts and secret organizations like the R&AW plus the SFF to infiltrate and help the resistance organizations of the then East Pakistan (Bangladesh) like the ‘Bangladesh liberation force’ (BLF) and ‘Mukti Bahini’ in 1971 liberation war of Bangladesh. It was in Chittagong that helped SFF cut its teeth in real terms during the war and establish itself as a name to reckon with by drawing first blood of the Pakistan army as early as September /October 1971 much before the Indian army did the same in December 1971.
Chittagong in present day Bangladesh had the unique quality to spring board into public attention even during the British times when in a sensational ‘Chittagong armoury raid’ the legendary freedom fighter Surya Sen and his band of mavericks did the unthinkable by raiding the armoury of police and auxiliary forces of the Bengal province in British India in April 1930 to help the Indian cause of independence. Be that as it may, the fact that India is celebrating its 53rd anniversary of liberation war, it calls for remembering the unsung heroes (read Tibetan guerrillas) who saw their piece of action in a desolate land called as ‘Chittagong hill tracts’ in an operation known as ‘OP EAGLE’ that still has been kept ‘under wraps’ by the successive governments for reasons best known to them. Carried out by the Tibetan resistance fighters as mentioned above, that too who were not natives of India and not participating in their own war goes to prove their singular dedication and gratitude to India for having given them shelter from the Chinese in their hour of distress.
In 1971 as spring season began metamorphosing into summer, the summer heat rose in India’s capital New Delhi so did the political temperature. Bangladesh was on top of the agenda of every high and mighty who counted in the corridors of power. With the situation suddenly spiraling out of control due Pak army spearheading ‘OP Search light’ in March 1971; India was unsure of its response (direct intervention in East Pakistan). Instead RN Kao, the R&AW chief and PN Haksar the principal advisor to the PM advised her to support the Bengalis of East Pakistan in their fight for independence and survival. Thus, the ball was set into motion when Mrs Indira Gandhi deferring to the pleas of her topmost security advisors, wrote a secret wire message to the Government of Tibet (in exile at Dharamshala) stating (quote) —‘We cannot compel you to fight a war for us. But the fact is that Gen AAK Niazi is treating the people of East Pakistan very badly. India has to do something about it and it would be appreciated if you could help us fight the war for liberating the people of Bangladesh.’’(Unquote).
Hence SFF was willy-nilly sucked into the whirlpool of decades old Indo-Pak animosity which proved its finest hour carved out with blood, guts and glory. It would be in fitness of things to just have a brief look of terrain obtaining in CHT (Chittagong hill tracts) , where this piece of action was played with superb professional excellence by the guerillas of SFF in conjunction with the BLF under OP EAGLE. Kaptaidam over river Karnaphuli holds key to the control of water flow in numerous water channels in the region. This river enters CHT from India at Demagiri and then flows all the way to Chittagong port in the south west. The river is deep and wide enough to be navigable throughout its run inside Bangladesh, and it touches some of the important human settlements at Barkal, Subalong, Chandraghona & Chittagong.
There was hardly any all-weather road in CHT and the movements were restricted to foot or boats. Because of the dense forest cover, the region is home to some of the most deadly snakes and other insects found in this part of the world. Malaria, dysentery, skin diseases, and common tropical diseases were omnipresent. The area was prone to cyclones& strong winds especially during the monsoons. CHT touched India’s Mizoram lending to an easy cross border movement of Mizo rebels since most of the Indian border posts were air-maintained and trails criss-crossed the region on either side of the International border. Buddhist- Chakma population that resided on either side of the IB and more so inside the Indian Territory had no love lost for rebels in Bangladesh. In more ways than one, they were neutral at best and anti Awami league in a worst case scenario. When it mattered the most, they sided with Mizo rebels and Pakistanis.
The then COAS, late Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw chose CHT precisely for employment of SFF during or rather before the war for the above mentioned attributes of this organization coterminous with the terrain peculiarities as found obtained. Kaptai dam was an important objective and if demolished, it had the capacity to flood the heartland of CHT, thus making life pretty tough for the resident forces. A leaf taken straight out of the book of the famous 2 WW ‘Dam busters’ squadron of the RAF that had bombed out the dams of river Rhine, Elbe and Danube in the heartland of Germany i.e. the ‘Ruhr valley’ and put spanners in Hitler’s plans of making a ‘short work’ of his victories in Europe. Though the overall C&C (Command& control) was with the Indian army since it controlled the battle space in that area, SFF was to operate under Maj Gen SS Uban, it’s IG (Inspector General) with direct control retained by the COAS without any interference from other parallel service HQs. Initial movement for this unique but unconventional hit into the enemy territory was by air, followed by a road move on the axis Silchar—Aizwal-Lungleh—Demagiri .
But since the bridges short of Demagiri were found to be broken, so it finally came down to foot movement for the Tibetan force to infiltrate into the enemy territory. Demagiri became the ‘de facto Force –HQ’ under Maj Gen Uban. ‘OP EAGLE’ entailed a broad tactics of ‘Hammer & anvil’ with the anvil being the BLF ( Bangladesh liberation force ) holding the border posts invested and the guerilla force aka SFF going in for the kill in a swift manner hammering them with their shock action and easy egress from the objectives. The force had three (3) columns under the command of a column commander designated as per their role on ground. Each column had a ‘Tibetan Dapon’ (brigadier equivalent in the Tibetan army) accompanying it. The column commander and the Dapon would strategize amongst themselves about the day’s operations and later on confer with the top most commander of the SFF, Maj Gen Uban about the best course of option to be followed. A very simple and straight chain of command. The Dapons accompanying the three columns were –Dapon Ratuk Ngawang, Dhondup Gyatotsang and Dapon Pekar Thinley. These columns were designated as per their area of operations viznorthern, central and southern in CHT.
The joint force i.e. the hammer & the anvil consisting of the SFF & BLF respectively numbering about 3000 strong infiltrated into the CHT on 11 October 1971 under the overall ruse provided by ‘Sheikh Fazlul Haque Moni’ the commander of BLF from Demagiri wearing uniforms of Gurkha soldiers with an insignia of 12th Gorkha as a disguise. Since most of these Tibetan guerrillas were Khampas (a fighter race from Kham region of Tibet) known for their martial prowess aka ‘Buddha’s warriors’ they carried their traditional Tibetan knives, light weapons viz Bulgarian AK -47s as a ruse to confuse the enemy. Officially SFF did not exist; hence the standard Indian army weaponry did not form their inventory of arms & ammunition.
The southern column of SFF went into action for the first time which had its operational task as surrounding Chittagong from the southerly direction facing the Arakan road to prevent fleeing enemy from crossing over to Burma as also destroying targets of opportunity. It attacked enemy camps viz Dhanubak & Deghalchhari and for the first time took on a much bigger Pakistani post of Barkal by the third week of November 1971 as also calling air strike by the IAF, a first in the history of jointness of operations by SFF & IAF. The column later on captured Pakistani posts like Khgrachhari but entailing a heavy casualty of 21 Tibetan soldiers in this entire action. On express orders from the AHQ, the force blocked the Arakan road, forcing the Pak army take the train route to Dohajari on 12th December 1971 thus taking the entire Chittagong in its occupation. Later on SFF took on the radio station at Kalurgaht with the BLF commander Sheikh Fazlul Haque Moni ruling the air waves too by his broadcast to the citizens of Chittagong. The northern & central columns meanwhile went for their respective targets of Shubhlong & Kashalong Khal so that the enemy couldn’t escape to Rangamati.
The beauty of these columns was that they carried out their operations much before India went formally to war with Mrs Gandhi initially reluctant to give permission for the IAF to airlift these SFF troops, but later relented. Sqn Ldr Parvez Jamasji, VRc played a stellar role in these operations. From his office in Delhi , RN Kao the R&AW chief would beckon Maj Gen Uban with the words—‘Uban, sabotage and harass them, get into their heads, destroy what you can. ‘Bring back CHT’. With 53 years down the line, it is high time that these mavericks of Chittagong are made to enter formally the military history books of our country, thereby giving long standing credit due to them that has been denied all along.
(The writer is a retired army officer and a regular scribe of Rising Kashmir; he can be approached on his email: slalotra 4729@gmail.com)
