KARGIL NARRATIVE
By Colonel Satish Singh Lalotra
‘The real war will never get in the books’—Walt Whitman.
The armies of nations the world over are not generally known to be staunch defenders of free speech, because that’s the way they are built on an edifice which supports their aspect of functionality. Free speech is generally considered an anathema in an organization where the very basis of existence devolves upon typical ‘Top- down’ orders to be delivered in a very cold and clinical method, and their acceptance down the chain of command regardless of their correctness. Since the time of ‘Cave man ‘days, man has always been at war often with his own tribe driven by the sole objective of survivability. Having been bestowed with one of the sharpest brains in the ecosystem, he had often been found to cross the so called lines of survivability to transgress into areas that brought him into direct conflict with his environment where his species type were his competitors in matters concerning their own survivability in terms of garnering food, wealth and a gargantuan appetite for dominance. The rise of warfare has its genesis firmly hardwired into the very being of a man owing to the basics as mentioned above. The ‘Fog of war’ and its attendant effects which are inevitable truths of a conflict often lie buried deep into the recesses of the’ war zone’ that beckon writers, authors and historians alike to put the most uncomfortable of truths as well as victories into correct perspective for posterity to draw lessons from.
One such conflict that has seen guns having fallen silent on both sides of the ‘Line of control’ for the last twenty five years has been the ‘Kargil war’ ; the so called India’s first televised war that was live streamed across millions of households bringing the horrors of war face to face with us. In fact the hype that got involved with this televised version of conflict led countless intellectuals, writers, politicians, diplomats and even senior army people to indulge in a ‘War of narratives’ across both sides of the Radcliffe line. The competition amongst different versions, interpretation of events & the context which led to numerous innuendoes flying thick and fast during this conflict resulted it into not only being termed a localized skirmish but also led to massive cover-ups of monumental proportions that bordered into a gall difficult to swallow. It devolved upon the actual participants of this conflict as well as independent scribes cum journalists to put the account straight for the country to draw lessons from in black and white as also tell the nation ‘How not to handover’ own sovereignty and territorial integrity that lay strung on the mighty peaks of Himalayas. Though numerous books, articles, pamphlets, SOP’s and videos have now been churned out along with the famous ‘Kargil review committee’ report that incisively go like a surgeon’s knife to unravel India’s biggest military surprise since independence on the Line of control, but nothing comes closer to few seminal scholastic creations like ‘Kargil from surprise to victory’ penned by none other than the then COAS Gen VP Malik, ‘Kargil -untold stories from the war’ by Rachna Bisht Rawat, ‘Kargil war-the turning point’ by Col MB Ravindranath , VRc, ‘Kargil -the heights of bravery’ by Azad singh Rathore, ‘Soldier’s diary -Kargil- the inside story’ by Harinder Baweja. From other side of the Radcliffe line , books like ‘From Kargil to the coup’ by noted Pakistani writer cum journalist Nasim Zehra lays bare the Pakistani perfidy that was woven around few important personalities of her nation who literally by their avowed brinkmanship towards India had pushed that theocratic nation on the precipice.
The fact that the country is celebrating silver jubilee of this conflict on 26th July 2024, it remains to be seen how much the nation has trudged ground in its effort to close in the gaps both figuratively and literally in our national security grid that were left asunder by our western neighbour. Though each book by the acclaimed writer tries to cover vitals of this conflict, it has been given to understand that the narrative so peddled quite contrarily differs from each other as found in these literary masterpieces. That noted scribes cum journalists too jumped into this imbroglio with their own pre-conceived notions and recorded their versions of the conflict as deemed fit by them further queers the pitch for an ordinary citizen of this country to make a sound decision of his understanding of the ’cause and effects’ of this high altitude war. War is like life that has to be dealt with foresight, but only understood in hindsight. What if the hindsight too is blurred by the skewedness ingrained in the foresight? The plethora of recommendations that were put forward by the KRC (Kargil rview committee) remain unanswered even after quarter century of it made being public. It is not that nothing has been done to address the main areas of concern that led to such a big military surprise for India from its bête noire. From improvement in infrastructure, military buildup, signal communications, intelligence, dumping of ammunition, lowering the age of command of units to make the CO as well the officers under him more lean and fit in such punishing terrains, building a new air strip at Kargil and a general atmosphere of cordiality and bonhomie with the locals have put the armed forces on a high pedestal in the eyes of the locals. But is that enough to counter the ever lurking danger across the LC?
It will be appreciated by the readers of this article , that it has been always India’s wont to get surprised both at it western/northern front as well as the eastern front from our misplaced notions of settled territorial disputes with both of our neighbours who are inimical to our interests. Gen Malik’s book admits this fact in so many words along with another damning indictment of our operational policy of vacating the winter posts to be occupied only during the summer season reposing a blind faith in our adversary doing the same act. The fact that this blind faith of ours was not backed up by a 24x 7 surveillance cover either by the UAVs or Drones proves that all the senior commanders were living under a ‘Micawber tendency’ that everything will turn up fine despite our poor condition on the LC. Moreover the latest video of Brig Devinder singh, Batalik sector commander during the Kargil operations puts paid to the sense of obduracy as well as denial that were seen in his senior commanders who initially refused to believe the enormity of the intrusion that had taken place right under their very noses. And accordingly allocated resources in terms of troops, ammunition, transport and supplies as well as reserves of all kinds. Few papers and articles as well books too have very ably questioned the merging of ‘Joint intelligence committee'( JIC) , an autonomous body comprising subject experts with that of the all-powerful NSCS ( National Security Council Secretariat) way back in 2018 in an attempt to consolidate the country’s security apparatus towards the Modi’s first term. Has this merging of two entities yielded desired results? Many of the books on this conflict have risen reasonable doubts of the efficacy of the JIC even during the buildup to the Kargil operations. The fact that ‘JIC’ consisting of senior representatives of ministries of defence, home, external affairs, RAW, IB and the three service heads of the intelligence under a fulltime secretary couldn’t get the Pakistani designs in 1999 , many of these books have now come very heavily on the Modi Government’s flip flops that were enacted in 2018 by its decision of merger of JIC with that of NSCS.
Within two years of the merging of JIC with that of NSCS, a national tragedy of gargantuan proportions befell Indian army in May/ June 2020 at Galwan by way of Sino-Indian clash resulting into loss of precious 20 lives of soldiers of the IA, that prompted many strategic papers & think tanks to question the sagacity of this merger. A report in a prominent book of national level goes a step ahead when it ascribes to the fact that first reports on sightings of Chinese troops near the LAC In Ladakh were available since mid-April 2020. More specific inputs were available only days later, indicating that allegations of intelligence failure may not be true altogether. The extent of damage incurred in the clash almost a month later indicates that these intel inputs were either glossed over by the decision -makers when assessing Chinese intent, or worse were never conveyed to the Indian army. If this is the case as late as 4 years back, the book very soundly asks the readers the role and its efficacy twenty years back of this august body ( JIC) in 1999 in catching the intent of Pakistanis? One might think it is obvious in a military conflict who has won and who has lost. But is it? It seems to be commonly accepted fact that the Americans lost the Vietnam War, even though they won almost all or most of them on ground. Wars, modern military theory states are not won on the battlefield -they are won in the people’s minds, in the cognitive domain. To secure the support of the population for participating in military operations a government must therefore present good persuasive reasons. Such reasons have come to be called as ‘War narratives’. A war narrative can be seen as a reason whose job it is to bolster the conclusion that participating in a war, often far away from home territory, is legitimate and right. It is here that that the role of the books as an instrument of state power comes into its actuality.
In the past too Indian writers both from the defence fraternity as well as from the civilian background provided enough fodder in the form of their valuable books and research papers that dissected the role of armed forces, governments, think tanks comprising eminent strategists as well as policy makers that went into the ‘Why and wherefores’ of operations impinging upon national security and territorial integrity. Many were guided by the sole aim of ‘self- catharsis’ since they didn’t want to depart this mortal world heaving on their chests the weight of their ill-timed decisions and expediencies of situations as they confronted them in the course of performing their duties in an official capacity. In other cases the writers wanted to present a very dispassionate view of the whole war to their readers simultaneously in an effort to showcase their hamstrung position owing to their being in a very junior position in the army hierarchy to be of any consequence. Books like ‘Himalayan blunder’ by Brig JP Dalvi belong to this genre, whereas books like ‘War in high Himalayas’ by Maj Gen DK Palit,VRc ( DGMO in 1962) belongs to the former category relating to Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Be that as it may, twenty five years in the life time of a democracy (75 + years) is not less for the powers that be to take stock of the still evolving situation in an area that saw the rivers of Shingo & Indus turn red baptized by the blood of unwavering resolve and courage of an Indian soldier under the most unmitigating factors of terrain and Pakistani chicanery. If books as mentioned above could be of any help as a mitigating factor on this silver jubilee of Vijay Divas, each written word would be worth its weight in gold in those treatises.
(The writer is a retired army officer)
