By Colonel Awadhesh Kumar, Special Forces
(An old article published in Jagruk Bharat)
…. Now an indirect tribute has been paid to this incident too in the Current Hindi movie URI.
1. Lt Col Manvendra Singh, M L A, Rajasthan, Ex MP (also member of Standing Committee on Defence), Editor Defence and Security Alert and well versed with Indian Special Forces, himself being a Paratrooper, has written a very valid article with respect to the recent Special Forces Operations at Pampore. It was a deeply tragic operation where we lost five brave hearts….02 CRPF personnels and 03 Special Forces personnels, two of whom were Captains. He has very rightly brought out the fact that Regular Army is about mass where as Special Forces about less. The twain do not meet. The blame for this loss has been placed by him squarely on the Army.
2. On the other hand, justification given by Lt Gen Syed Atta Hasnain, erstwhile GOC 15 Corps, Srinagar, in his ” Reiteration Of Last Mile Philosophy ” is that during the last phase of terrorism, there will be casualty on Army side, higher in ratio than when there were larger number of terrorists operating in the valley. This is because the IA Officer Cadre leads from the front, even beyond professional needs. Also the Top Brass is heavily pressurized by issues like Human Rights, Political and Legal correctness of the action, ground control of the situation against agitating locals, media pressures etc. Due to such pressures they are compelled to hasten up the operation and bring it to a conclusion. As per General Hasnain, this kind of casualty is inevitable in the LAST MILE situation.
3. Well, all Indian Citizens by now are fully aware of the fact that in any type of combat our Defence Forces will never flinch from Duty and will not hesitate to even lay down their life in the Line of Duty. However why should our brave hearts be asked, by our leaders Military or Political,to lay down their lives unnecessarily. Who should be held responsible for the unwarranted and tragic loss of lives of five of our personnel ?
4. Before holding any one individual or the system responsible for the above tragic death of our brave men at Pampore, I would like to narrate an incident quite way back from OPERATION PAWAN :
One of the seven telephones laid down in one straight row on a table started ringing at 0745h. Glancing at it, I casually picked it up, as it was the sixth one, provided by the 54 Infantry Division Signal Regiment…The Normal One. The seventh was a field telephone provided by the 54 Artillery Brigade Signal Regiment giving access to field exchanges of 9 PARA COMMANDO and 10 PARA COMMANDO. The first was a hotline giving direct access to General Officer Commanding, the Chief Of Staff and the Principal Staff Officers of HQ OFC IPKF (Over All Force Commander, Indian Peace Keeping Force) at Chennai, and the balance four were hot lines similarly to HQ 4, 36, 54 and 57 located at Vavunnia, Trincomalle, Batticaloa and Palely,all located in the Jaffna Peninsula of Sri Lanka. The call was from General Staff Officer 2 (Operations) from HQ 54 Infantry Division, inquiring about a Trial Report,regarding a trial ordered by the COAS, General Sunderji himself during his visit to IPKF. I told him that the interim report was already on it’s way to Army HQ and a detailed one would soon follow.
This was the Ad Hoc HQ Special Forces raised in end November 1987 at Palely, since all three Parachute Commando Battalions (1, 9 and 10….we had only three those days) were already deployed with the IPKF by mid October. Initially the HQ comprised five officers including the Commander. However by end December, the Commander trimmed the size to just two….Commander and one Staff Officer. I, a Captain, was retained as the staff officer while the three Majors were reverted back to their respective units. In spite of it’s size, it functioned like a HQ. When General Sardeshpandey took over the 54 Division from General Harkirat, he first visited his four Infantry Brigade HQ and his Artillery Brigade. When our Commander went to meet him and brief him about the on goings of Special Forces (This HQ SF reported directly to HQ IPKF and also had direct access to Army HQ),the GOC insisted on coming to the HQ itself for briefing. He did, with the full motorcade of a GOC, just as he had visited his Brigade HQ. Though we were located inside his Divisional HQ, right behind his office, in precisely two rooms of a small building. There was proper introduction to the Staff Officer, the Signal JCO, the Administrative JCO and the Head Clerk. Keeping with the style of the visit, The Commander introduced me as his Chief of Staff !! The briefing was totally professional and the tea offered (with help from 9 & 10) was befitting a General Officers Visit to any Brigade HQ.
At around 0800h, the same telephone started ringing once again. This time it was the General Staff Officer 1 (operations) from 54 Division, with the same query regarding the Trial Report. At 0900h it was the turn of the Colonel General Staff of the Division, who also shared a joke as he happened to be a paratrooper and had served in 9 too. Then at 0915, the call came from the General Staff Officer 1 (operations) of HQ IPKF, followed by call from Colonel General Staff and then there was ring on the hot line from Brigadier General Staff, HQ, IPKF. All this while the Commander was busy writing the Operational Orders for a coming Special Forces Operations and though he was hearing every thing, had not even glanced towards me. On hearing the hotline he just gave a fleeting glance. Around 1000h there was a call from Military Operations, New Delhi. A Colonel in a very authoritative voice asked about the status of the Trial Report and added that it was required to be put up to the Chief on priority. In reply I too parroted my version.
Then finally there was a Brigadier from Military Operations on line. The Commander must have heard it because he immediately asked me to hand over the phone to him. The voice from New Delhi was just able to say….the chief wants the Report…..when our commander cut him in and said, I still remember the exact words……TELL CHIEF that for a peace of paper, I am not going to jeopardize an ongoing operation, neither I am going to risk the life of the Officer who carried out the trials,by calling him back from the operation over an unprotected route, nor risk the life of the escort party escorting him,……an interim report has already been sent, final report will be sent once the operation is over and the officer is back to Palely, AND NOW P L E A S E DO NOT DiSTURB ME….. Surprisingly no one at least disturbed me thereafter and finally the much sought after Report was prepared and sent in a weeks time.
The Commander was not from the Special Forces but a staunch Gurkha from Sam Manekshaw’s unit and in my opinion, as I saw him, nothing less than him….may be except that he never or seldom cracked a joke as did the Field Marshal. In fact he always watched our dealings with rest of the Army with a bemused look and then one day remarked that” you chaps have to fight on two fronts…. One the LTTE and the other the Indian Army. However as a Commander he always ensured non interference in SF operations. About 14 years later in 2002,as General Officer Commanding In Chief, Northern Command, he, Lt General R K Nanavatty, bluntly gave out his requirements to be met by New Delhi (this time it was the Govt), before his Northern Army would march towards West or North West….just as Sam Manekshaw had spoken when Indira Gandhi had the first Cabinet meeting in Apr71 for Bangladesh.
5. The above narrative clarifies the whole issue and now it can be clearly said that the first person to be held responsible is the General Officer Commanding the VICTOR FORCE. Once the Special Forces were called in then the GOC should have retained only the Operational Control ensuring sanitization around the target area, fobbing off all types of pressures from higher HQ, locals, media etc. The command of actual Operation by Special Forces should have been handed over to the senior most SF officer present, irrespective of the Rank. GOC should have ensured that no one else interfered with the operation till it’s conclusion. In case he did all this then he is not to be blamed for any thing. Casualty then was pure bad luck.
6. The second person to be held responsible is the GOC 15 Corps. He should have ensured allocation of SF for this Operation only as a last option. Clearance for SF Operations has to be not below Corps level. His HQ should have provided all additional support for sanitization etc to VICTOR FORCE. Similarly management of National Media and higher HQ were his responsibility. It seems he has failed in some of the aspects.
7. The third person to be held responsible is the Northern Army Commander. With two SF units under his direct command and in addition elements of a third SF unit, has he insisted on establishing a SF Cell, permanent or Adhoc, under his Major General General Staff ? Has he carried out any review of Command & Control procedures for such SF Operations. The present SF set up within Military Operations at Army HQ had started as COMMANDO CELL in 1987.
8. The next one to be held responsible is the COAS for not demanding the forth with raising of SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND and till it is authorized by the Cabinet,Re raising of Army’s HQ SPECIAL FORCES. Also has the Chief delved into the Staffing / Manning of the SF set up in his own HQ ? SF is not the particular colour of a beret but an experience and gut feeling. And finally both the Raksha Mantri and the Pradhan Mantri are to be held responsible for non creation till date of Tri Service SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND as per the recommendations of the Review Committee post Kargil.
9. At battalion level and below it is mostly physical courage which comes into play and as shown by our Forces there is no lack of it. However at higher level it is the Moral Courage which comes into play. As Manvender Singh has rightly put it…Authority is about having the S P I N E.
