6yBy Colonel Awadhesh Kumar, Special Forces
1
Special Operations Force of Pakistan: The Beginning
SSG or the Special Services Group of Pakistan was raised in 1956 by amalgamating 17th Battalion The Baluch Regiment and 312 Garrison Company located at Cherat and Attock respectively and converting it to 19th Battalion The Baluch Regiment (SSG). A selection test was held for all officers and men of the old 17 BALUCH desirous of remaining with 19 BALUCH (SSG). Majority of men were weeded out in the tough physical tests. Remaining members along with volunteers raised Quaid Company of SSG, which later became part of 1 Commando Battalion. Consequently, the 19 BALUCH (SSG) inherited many of the traditions and insignia of the Baloch Regiment. It was much later that they converted to Maroon beret. The SSG initially had 6 companies and each company specialized in desert, mountain, ranger, or underwater warfare. The mandate given was to specialise in asymmetrical warfare.
The first commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Aboobaker Osman Mitha, who commanded it for six years from 28Sep55 to 24 Jun1961. He came from a very affluent Muslim family living in Malabar Hills, Bombay. Shunning family business after school and joining IMA instead, he passed out from Dehradun, in 1942 getting commissioned into the 4th Bombay Grenadiers. After volunteering for the Parachute Regiment, he served in Burma during World War II and was dropped behind Japanese lines for high-risk operations. In 1947 Mitha opted for Pakistan leaving behind his family and friends. He fell in love with Indu Chatterji, daughter of Prof. Gyanesh C. Chatterji of Lahore Government College, who had grown up in Lahore but later moved to Delhi. Major General A A Rudra, India Army was her uncle. Indu went back to Pakistan to marry him. Mitha also remained in touch with his old Indian Parachute Regiment through his friend Capt S C sinha ( later Maj Gen and Col of Para Regt ) for quite someti. Mitha qualified for the Staff College, Quetta and was serving in GHQ when picked to raise the SSG.
i
Co -incidentally the Officer who would raise the Indian Counter part to 19 BALUCH( SSG ) – 9 PARACHUTE COMMANDO in Jul 1966, his name too starts with the letter M ie. Lt Colonel Megh Singh. Though his Meghdoot Force was still 9 years away. It was Meghdoot Force which gave a befitting reply to OP GIBRALTAR raiders in September 1965.Then It was 1 PARA , Mitha’s Indian Unit which captured Hajipir in 1965 , later 1 PARA too converted to COMMANDOS in 1977.
In 1954, Mitha was selected to raise an elite commando unit for Pakistan Army. Cherat, a hill station near Peshawar became the highly restricted site where the commandos were to be trained and based. The unit was being raised with technical and material assistance from the Americans. In Mitha’s opinion this was a CIA plan to prepare a stay-behind unit in Pakistan in view of the Russian threat. Does this ring a bell with the Indians regarding another Coincidence ……in the aftermath of 1962 the Americans assisted Establishment 22 came up at Chakrata !!
The army C-InC General Ayub Khan gave a freehand to Lt. Col. Mitha to raise the SSG. The Americans lived a lavish life and so Mitha’s sole instruction to his handpicked Pakistani officers was “Be proud of your poverty.” Mitha came to prominence as the founder of Special Service Group. He became a legend within the SSG, a fact attested by officers who served with SSG after him. He was extremely hands on and leading from the front type of an officer. This made him a legend not only in the Army, but also with the Navy and Air Force. In 1965 he commanded an Infantry Brigade in East Pakistan. He left his mark on hundreds of young cadets when he commanded the Pakistan Military Academy from 1966-1968. He later commanded the 1 Armoured Division from 1968-1970 and then was appointed the QMG, Pakistan Army, before being sent to Dacca in March 1971 as Deputy to Tikka Khan for a few weeks. He was prematurely retired in 20 Dec1971 by Bhutto in the capacity of Chief Martial Law Administrator based on advice of acting C-InC Lt General Gul Hassan Khan.
After retirement he was stripped of his pension and medals ( this lasted 7 years) one of which was HILAL- E – JURAT without due cause, and that was quite a surprise to the public as he was never courtmartialed. Though Maj Gen Mitha gained more popularity by this due to which he was kept under surveillance by the Bhutto Administration as he was also a hero for his juniors in the SSG. He remained under surveillance through the Bhutto years. He died in December 1999. As he was the founder of SSG group so SSG guard came to pay him tribute
2
SSG The Scope
In 1960, SSG teams were deployed for their first Operational special reconnaissance missions in the tribal belt as their first combat assignments, at the Durand Line– the Afghanistan-Pakistan international border.
The four primary missions of SSG were foreign internal defence, reconnaissance, direct actions, and the unconventional warfare– their most important mission. Later on Counter terrorism was added as the fifth mission. Probably between 1960 to 1965 six or more companies had been added to the SSG. Thus In August 1965, scope of SSG was raised from a battalion size force to a larger brigade size Special Operations outfit and instead of 19 BALUCH (SSG) they adopted the name Special Service Group. Now there were three Parachute Commando Battalions, a few specialised warfare Companies, Support elements, a training school, a Para Training School and a Forces HQ.
The Special Service Group’s other roles include the combat search and rescue, seek and destroy, counter-proliferation, military hostage rescue, information operations, peacekeeping missions, psychological operations, security assistance, and enemy manhunts.
The Motto of the Force is MAIN JANBAZAM( I am Valiant) and colour is Maroon and Sky Blue.
The initial training and orientation was based on the US Special Forces pattern with whom they co-operated closely for training and exercises during the Cold War years. Later on, Chinese training, tactics, weapons, and equipment were also introduced.
In June 2003 under a major reorganisation it became a divisional size force headquartered at Tarbela Cantonment, with Major-General A. F. Alvi becoming the first GOC. Incidentally at many places this Force is nowadays referred to as 50 Airborne Division SSG.
Around this time as a contrast, the Indian Army had managed to kill its HQ Special Forces with a well aimed BRAHMOS, right at the take off stage.
SSG nowadays comprises eight battalions ( in comparison, the much bigger Indian Army has just 9 Units of SF and 5 Units of Parachute Infantry Manning the 50 Parachute Brigade by rotation. So it’s time that 50 PARA BRIGADE becomes 44 AB Division by raising four more para Units or still better 50 IBG and 51 IBG!!) under command a Lt Colonel each, with around 700 men in four companies. Each company has three platoons and each platoon has three 10-man teams. May be out of the eight units some are having Airborne Infantry role or may be seven units are on Parachute Commando role with one unit, the 3rd Battalion at Powindahs on Special Forces role. In an officially published document the given locations are :
At Tarbela—-—- HQ 50 AB Division SSG,, Musa Company, Iqbal Buland Company and a HQ Special Operations Task Force Comprising 3 Commando Bn at Powindahs, 8 Commando Bn at Al Azb and Zarar Company at Tarbela.
At Cherat——— Special OperationsSchool and another HQ SOTF comprising 5 Commando Battalion at Zilzaal, 6 Commando Battalion at Al-Samsaam and 7 Commando Battalion Babrum.
At Attock—— HQ 11 SSG Brigade comprising 1 Commando Battalion (Yaldram), 2 Commando Battalion (Rahber) and 4 Commando Battalion (Yalghar).
The Parachute Training School located at Peshawar functions under HQ SSG and conducts five types of courses namely Basic Airborne Course, Jump master and Airborne Operation Course, High Altitude and Low Opening Course, Pathfinder Course and Parachute Packing and Maintenance Course. The three independent specialised commando companies probably have 300 Commandos each and two of them function directly under the Force HQ apart from other support elements :
Musa Company – Specializes in Amphibious Operations. It was raised in 1970 and is known for one of the toughest training schedules. It was initially trained by SAS / SBS and later by US Navy Seals.
Zarrar Company – Specializes in Counter-terrorism.
Iqbal buland company – Specializes in signals and telecommunications.
Special Operations School is located in Cherat which is called the home of Special Services Group. Cherat is located in the Khattak Ranges at approx 4500 ft above sea level in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. It is 52 Kilometres from Peshawar and 54 kilometres from Nowshera. The climate in Cherat is very pleasant in summers and cold in winters. Strong winds are a constant feature. Since serving with Special Services Group is very demanding both physically and mentally, this institution aims at imparting such training in an environment which permits the student trainees to discover the limits of their physical, psychological and mental prowess. It aims at obtaining optimum mental and physical performance from students in extreme conditions. This makes possible the right selection of personnel for induction into Special Services Group.
The SSG has converted most of the available area into their training ground. On the bare rocks one can still see the crests of the British regiments that lived there. The SSG has put up a huge monument at a prominent place to commemorate its fallen comrades. The survival range is an interesting place and visitors marvel at the clever improvisations done by the Special Forces to strike terror into the hearts of the enemy. The SSG not only prepares troops from all branches of the military but it also trains soldiers from friendly countries. The Cherat training is held in high esteem internationally. A barrack has been converted into a museum, where personal possessions of heroes, relics from special operations and war trophies have been displayed.
The school has a dedicated faculty and staff for each category of the course, which are as under:
Basic Training Wing
Advance Training Wing
Special Training and Publication Wing
Research, Trials and Publication Wing
Administrative Support Wing
Courses Conducted by the Special Operations School are Basic Commando Course ( All Ranks), Officers Advance Commando Course, Anti Terrorist Course,Sniper Course,Security Course (Officers and Soldiers), Advance Frogmen Course (Officers and Soldiers) and Professional Unarmed Combat Course (Martial Arts-Officers and Soldiers).
The command and control of the special forces fall in the domain of the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Forces Command with HQ at Rawalpindi. Maj Gen Tahir Masood Bhutta, is the current General Officer Commanding Special Services Group.In November 2018 Major General Abid Rafiq was installed as the first colonel commandant of SSG. He is presently serving as the Commander Special Security Division China Pakistan Economic Corridor but has been superseded for promotion to the rank of Lt General.
3
The First Group Commander
Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, MC
Lt Col Muhammad Aslam, MC took over the command on 25 Jun 61 from Col Mitha and commanded till 5 Jan 64. Nothing much is available about him.
Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, MC was the third commanding officer of the SSG which at this juncture had been upgraded to a Brigade sized Force and Mehdi thus became the first Group Commander. 19 BALUCH went into suspended animation and was re raised as 19 BALUCH (Recce & Sp) in Mar 1969.
He was born on 24 December 1921 in Karnal, India into the clan of the 12 Syeds directly descended from grandson of Imam Hussain, the Holy Prophet’s Grandson, who was martyred at Karbala.
Joining the army in 1941 he fought in Burma and was awarded a MC for valour. He immediately donated the 26 acres of land given to him for his Military Cross to the Muslim League. On 22nd December 1945, he again wrote to the Quaid-e-Azam, on the Regimental letter head of his unit 1/15 Punjab Regiment, now 9 Punjab, excitedly describing about his first parachute jump. He was nearly court-martialled for this.
As member of the boundary force responsible for refugees transfer, he saved 1000’s on both sides from certain death. His bristling moustache and his troops were mostly enough to put the fear of God on both Muslim and Hindu marauding mobs. As a result not one of the trains and convoys he escorted suffered a single casualty.
In 1946 Capt Mehdi had been posted to IMA, Dehradun as instructor. The Commandant Brig. Iyappa had told Lt. Col. Atiqur Rehman that ” Mehdi was a real find” ! So later Capt Mehdi alongwith Lt. Col Attiqur Rehman, Maj Abid Ali Bilgrami, Major Abdul Hamid Khan and Captain Tikka Khan, and others formed the officer nucleus of the new Pakistan Military Academy. He was appointed as the first Adjutant. Later he became founder Company Commander of Qasim company in PMA. Many of Pakistan’s Army’s future generals were cadets who passed out from the Academy under the stern gaze of “Killer” Mehdi.
He was the only officer till 1950 to have been given a Distinction in his Staff College Course in Camberley, England. So naturally he became an instructor at the Staff College Quetta and also subsequently helped establish the War College under Maj. Gen. Sahibzada Yaqub and became its first Chief Instructor. Before and after he served on many key staff and command roles as Brigade Major, G2, G1, Col Staff, Commanding Officer 15 PUNJAB and Group Commander SSG, as well as staff appointments at the GHQ. After leaving the Army he became a leading Geo Political authority & expert.
When Mehdi commanded 15 PUNJAB, the unit became the top battalion in the Division prompting his Brigade Commander to remark “Killer, leave some trophies for the other units!!” His troops both loved him and feared him and so honoured him in later years after his retirement by making him the Honorary Colonel.
One of the reasons he was handpicked personally by Gen. Ayub to head the upgraded SSG was because of an earlier assignment the late President Ayub had personally given.
During 1962 – 63, the Afghans were stirring trouble in Baluchistan directly and through the Khan of Kalat. Lt Col Mehdi then on a Staff assignment in Quetta was given the undercover task to operate inside Afghan territory and conduct completely hush hush clandestine operations.Only the Corps Commander knew, other than the President. It was a case of complete deniability should these guys ever be caught.
So Lt Colonel Mehdi got 100 or so top Mehsud marksman from Waziristan through his old Subedar Major of World War 2 days, had them trained. Over the next few months, they made life hell for Afghan military convoys and pickets and posts. A few months later President Ayub came to Quetta. At the airport as Col. Mehdi saluted him he gently put his hand on his shoulder and said ever so softly. ” Call it off Mehdi…they’ve agreed to talk” and that was it.
Thus was appointed Colonel S G Mehdi as the Commander SSG.His crowning glory at SSG was to transform the SSG from a Guerrilla outfit into a Commando outfit operating behind enemy lines and conducting Special Operations.
Earlier most of the training of SSG was under the control of USA military advisers whose task was to launch insurgency operations against a possible future Russian occupation of Pakistan with targets such as the Radio Pakistan, Ravi Bridge etc!. On taking over Mehdi first request to GHQ was the removal of all American advisers and their families from Cherat, then the SSG Headquarters. The Americans strongly resisted and as a final threat refused to help operate the parachute training school.
GHQ was in in a quandary, till Mehdi drove down to Pindi and convinced and assured them that the Para School would go ahead without the Americans. So the USA military advisers left. The Para school kept functioning and over a short period 1000 training jumps were made with ZERO casualties. The Americans had a 5% casualty rate documented as part of their SOP!!!
In fact 44 years old Colonel Mehdi was the first jumper out of the plane of the first batch of Para commandos wholly trained by Pakistani instructors. His last jump before that was in 1945,about 19 years ago!! Earlier an incredulous instructor tried to dissuade him saying…Sir even the parachutes have changed now from your 2nd World War time…but he would have none of it.
He renamed Cherat as the Eagles Nest. Personally selected and oversaw the design of the SSG para wing, it’s famous insignia of the Dagger and Lightening bolts, the selection of the distinctive Maroon beret and the label of SSG soldiers as Janbaz and not Jawan. The SSG officer and soldier was a “Mun Janbazum”. …..I am a Janbaz. Ever ready to lay down my life. He also had as their battle cry the stirring “Ya Ali” ! The last falling victim to sectarianism during Gen. Zia’s time.
His lasting legacy to SSG perhaps was the Angry Eagle exercise, considered one of the toughest military exercises in the world done over several months. Now Probably discontinued.
He was the ultimate commander and loved his troops and officers, always fought for them and supported them. He was also the ultimate disciplinarian and detested cowardice. He embraced Courage with a capital C. Both Physical and Moral.
The former got him his Military Cross the latter cost him his career.
He never suffered fools, always said what he thought was right and always stood by his values and convictions. As Group Commander SSG in 1965 he strongly opposed Operation Gibralter. Hence he refused to go along with the Army High Command.
In a famous encounter with the C-in-C, some time in June1965, Mehdi told him after Gen. Musa had heard both Gen. Akhtar Malik and him present their arguments for and against Gibralter “…Sir you’re the Commander in Chief so now tell us what do you think? …. Gen. Musa remained silent. Col. Mehdi repeated the question again this time very forcefully. To which Gen.Musa replied…It’s always very interesting listening to you Col Mehdi saheb”…. at this Mehdi saluted turned to Gen. Akhtar Malik and said…” You won’t get away with this…” and stormed out of the C-in C’s Operations Room.
Back at HQ SSG, he put his concerns in writing and sent it formally to GHQ. By return signal GHQ asked him to destroy his copy as they had done the same. He didn’t and much later his stance was vindicated by history. Then on 30th August 1965, he was suddenly sacked as Group Commander SSG for having opposed the PAF plan of raid on IAF airfields. The Operation went ahead sending many young men to certain death. Interestingly SSG records show him as the Commander right upto 21 September 1965.
Finally he retired in December 1968 as Station Commander Karachi. Even in this assignment he made waves. While receiving Alexi Kosygin, USSR Foreign Minister on a visit to Pakistan in 1967 he refused to lean forward even slightly to shake Kosygin’s hand and so the Russian Minister had to do the bowing. A picture captures this event ever so vividly. Politely enquired ( by now no one messed with him, not even the C in C) he said…” a soldier only bows when he falls to an enemy bullet…”
At one time, hailed as a future Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army by none other then President Ayub Khan, in his address to officers of the Staff College Quetta in 1963, Mehdi left the army in 1968, deeply hurt. A pain that never left him for the rest of his life. Not for not attaining higher rank but for the injustice he believed was done to him for speaking the truth.
Baba e SSG ol R Ghafar Mehndi PKG
He had four loves. Pakistan, Pakistan Army, SSG and his unit 15 Punjab Regiment.. His family, though very close to him, had a tough time competing with his 4 loves. Colonel Mehdi, MC died on 13 March 2015.
4
Operation Gibraltar And The SSG
Pakistan Govt and its Army both claim that they were totally surprised by the Indian attack on 6 Sep 1965. However then C-in-C PAF Air Marshal Asghar Khan clearly states :
“In the last 60 years, India has never attacked Pakistan, as it cannot afford it. Indians know well, if Pakistan is destroyed, they will be the next target. But we did so four times and the first attack was on Kashmir…Indian forces came to East-Pakistan when people were being slaughtered there. Moreover, again at Kargil, Indian never mounted an assault…”
In 1965, the Air Chief came in conflict with GHQ led by C-In-C Gen. Musa Khan when he raised questions over the contingency plans and secret infiltrations in Kashmir. Neither Air HQ nor Naval HQ was kept informed by the GHQ when the second war with India was being planned out in 1965. He had boldly come out against the war with India during the meeting with the President Ayub Khan saying “a provoked India is likely to respond along the border in an all-out war.” President Ayub took the war option after being taken in by the arguments presented by his Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Subsequently in Aug 1965 Ayub refused to grant a third extension to Asgard Khan as Air Chief, who had taken over Command of PAF in 1957 at the age of 36 only.
General Musa the then C-In-C Army describes the genesis of the surprise Indian attack on 6th September as under:
“ Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Infantry Division in Kashmir, pressed the President to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities and helping the locals in organising an uprising against the occupying power. They succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India……. To the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators into Kashmir, code named Gibraltar’ was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. “
However once directed, General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. He himself writes “ I directed GOC 12 Division, to prepare a draft plan for the operation Gibraltar in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence.No civil official attended this briefing.”
“The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect. When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don’t you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose. Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.”
Thus it is very clear that OP GIBRALTAR was an Army plan, approved by the Supreme Commander and in spite of all this the C-in C, went along with it in a half-heartedly, non-professional and non-serious manner. Later he claimed to be surprised by the bold Indian Counter action ordered by Lal Bahadur Shashtri.
Mehdi’s No To Gibraltar
In April or early May 1965, the SSG Commander was directed by the Vice CGS, ( Major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to Murree and meet GOC 12 Division. The GOC’s outline plan of Gibraltar operation left Mehdi stunned. The plan was so bizarre as to be unacceptable to any logical, competent and professionally sound military person. It envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually.
To achieve the above, the plan was to infiltrate SSG with other troops inside Kashmir, for hit and run raids, live of the land and give Pakistan a strategic advantage. Mehdi termed it a “Bay of Pigs” similar to the ill fated USA attempt in Cuba. He said this because of its operational and tactical lack of preparedness and planning.
He frankly told Malik that the Operation was a non-starter. At GHQ, the same day he briefed the CGS and VCGS, who listened patiently. The CGS posed only one question. “You say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but GOC feels confident of its success.” Mehdi’s replied that, the conflicting viewpoints notwithstanding, as CGS Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as it was not a peace time war game, but involved the destiny of Pakistan itself. The CGS went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end. Both Malik and Mehdi then were asked to meet the C-In-C.
Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the GHQ, Colonel Mehdi reduced his arguments in writing, as to the reasons why Gibraltar shall fail. These, in brief, were:
* No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.
* The raids were in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively on initial back packs and then living off the land. Without any covert support across the CFL, this living off the land would prove fatal. Most of guerrillas were likely to be betrayed.
*GHQ had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids.
*All SSG officers, responsible for training and leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.
Neither the C-in-C Army nor CGS had the guts to stand up to the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by GOC 12 Division, were taking him on a long ride with Gibraltar, thus leading to his downfall (via Tashkent, as it eventually proved!). How could a professional Army miscalculate that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir. For inexplicable reasons the GHQ based its operational plan in Kashmir on this wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few plunged the country into an armed conflict.
5
The Ill Fated Parachute Drop of SSG In 1965 War
Though SSG managed to extricate itself from OP GIBRALTAR ( a few Companies did go for the normal operations in Kashmir) it could not save itself from another disaster which took place on 07 Sep 65.
This air assault operation had been conceived initially by PAF Chief Air Marshal Asgar Khān as part of operational contingencies in the event of an Indian aggression. Such advance operational plannings are normal at service HQ in peace time. GHQ had then passed the buck on to the commander of SSG. The Group Commander had emphatically pointed out that the concept of operation was faulty.
On his persistent refusal, GHQ ordered that Mehdi should give his reasons for not agreeing with the envisaged Contingency Plan direct to the HQ, PAF. A formal presentation had been made to Air Marshal Asghar Khan at Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers of SSG, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the CO of No. 1 Commando Battalion, and GSO2 Operations Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General). PAF Chief in presence of Gp Capt Mukhtar Dogar, a former transport pilot posted as Director of Air Intelligence, was told that only a simultaneous pre-emptive air strike akin to Israeli crippling air raids against the front line air bases as in 1956 Arab Israel War, could give the probability of success to the Commando raid. Mehdi also objected to the para-commandos after being dropped, just left there in the void, in the heart of 100% hostile population with no equivalent of French Maquis for support.
That this was an unmitigated disaster from beginning to end is correct but for no fault of the brave band of commandos or their officers.
Assuming that two basic pre-requisites of Strategic surprise and up to date accurate intelligence were met, the operational considerations for SSG’s employment were then spelt out by Col Mehdi:
a) The operations should be mounted in the early hours of the night.
b) Para -commandos must be dropped on the target or very near to it.
c) Exfiltration would be either by landing an aircraft if the airfield was captured, or by rendezvous with a helicopter, in view of the vast distances separating the targets from friendly forces.
(d)An accurate and up-to-date analysis of the target, its characteristics, size, shape and dimensions of its defences, and peculiarities of the general environments in which the target existed, had to be provided to the SSG by PAF/GHQ.
The requirements for the operation were largely reasonable and well thought out, except for the matter of exfiltration of the para-commandos after the mission. Landing transport aircraft on an airfield that was expected to be on full alert after the air strike was, in the least, a fanciful idea. As for helicopters, neither Pak Army, nor the PAF had troop transport versions that could evacuate a large number of commandos from enemy territory.
Next by 22 July 1965, Air Marshal Asghar Khan had retired after completing two four-year terms. The new C-in-C, Air Marshal Nur Khan, who had stayed out of the PAF for six years while on deputation as Managing Director PIA, had too many operational matters to catch up on. He therefore, apparently left it to Gp Capt Dogar and Col Mehdi to sort out the nuts and bolts of the assault. It so happened that Col Mehdi fell out with the Army C-in-C, for opposing the utilisation of commandos in a prolonged guerrilla warfare role of OP GIBRALTAR. On 31 August, he was thus replaced with one of the SSG battalion commanders, Lt Col Abdul Matin, as the officiating Commander of SSG.
Between Gp Capt Dogar and Lt Col Matin, a sticking point had been the number of airfields to be attacked, with the SSG pleading a shortage of commandos due to their other Operational commitments. Four airfields, viz Adampur, Ambala, Pathankot and Halwara were agreed upon, though a day before the attack, Ambala was cancelled.
Three teams, each of 60 commandos including three officers, were planned to be air-dropped by three C-130s. Each team was to have one wireless set for base/ air communications of their progress. Individual commandos were provided with two days’ rations (five meethi rotis each) and Rupees 400 in Indian currency.
Retrieval of the commandos after the mission was a tricky and dangerous affair, and a final decision was callously deferred. The options discussed included landing C-130s on the recently-attacked airfields to pluck the teams, and also for the teams to wend their way back on foot across enemy territory, with the farthest target being 96 km from the nearest border.
Cobbling Up the Teams
In response to GIBRALTAR, the Indians had captured Haji Pir Pass providing easy access to Muzaffarabad. So on 1 September, Pakistan frantically launched a riposte in Chamb Sector under OP GRAND SLAM.With the lifeline between Poonch and Jammu threatened by the imminent capture of the vital Akhnur Bridge, the Indian PM warned Pakistan in no uncertain terms that India would respond at a time and place of her choosing.
Those amongst the SSG airfield assault teams who were on leave rushed back, but it was discovered that as late as 6 September, there was still a personnel shortfall of 40%. In a last-minute cobbling effort, men from Group HQ, Unit HQ and rear companies were mustered to complete the required numbers. The motley teams had not conducted joint training, and some of the members did not even know each other, or their officers. Many personnel had not done any refresher para drops during the last one year. One team leader had not even completed his fifth and final training jump, while four volunteer staff officers, including one on low medical category (‘B’), were taken in desperately. The teams were as under:
*The Pathankot team comprised 64 personnel including three officers, viz Major Khalid Gulrez Butt, Capt Bunyad Hussain Syed and Capt Muhammad Azad.
*The Adampur team comprised 55 personnel including three officers, viz Capt Said Afzal Durrani, Capt Ghulam Ahmed Kabir and Capt Muhammad Ashraf.
*The Halwara team comprised 63 personnel including three officers, viz Capt Hasan Iftikhar, Capt Ghulam Ahmed and Capt Syed Hazoor Hasnain.
On 6 September at 0830 hours, GHQ informed the officiating SSG Commander, Lt Col Matin that the Indian Army had attacked across the IB at Wagah, therefore the SSG ‘Ibrahim’ and ‘Kamal’ Companies should be kept ready on short notice. At 1030 hours, another phone call from GHQ ordered the immediate move of the two companies to Peshawar, where they were to be briefed in detail by PAF’s Gp Capt Dogar. Almost as an afterthought, the Officer Commanding PTS was tasked by GHQ to prepare necessary equipment for the para drops. At mid-day, Gp Capt Eric Hall (Station Commander Chaklala, and senior supervisor of C-130 operations), Gp Capt Dogar and Lt Col Matin started a briefing session in Peshawar that lasted a full four hours.
Dogar announced that the three IAF airfields of Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot were to be attacked by para-commandos, with a time-on-target (TOT) of 2300 hours. At this, Lt Col Matin objected to the very short notice for the complex and difficult mission, and suggested that the mission be delayed by one day for better preparation. Gp Capt Dogar answered with a curt ‘now or never’ reply. It is uncertain whether Dogar had the C-in-C’s consent on this decision.
Both companies, which were still fumbling for important equipment like wire cutters and explosive detonator switches in Cherat, were ordered to reach Peshawar by 1600 hours for another briefing by Gp Capt Dogar and the C-130 aircrews. The briefing to the assault teams about their targets for the first time started at 1645h. They were told to destroy aircraft, radars, bomb dumps and ATC on the designated airfields. Details of recovery of the assault teams after the mission was accomplished, were confused and cursory. They were told that on receipt of a ‘mission accomplished’ radio signal from the team leaders, the C-130s would land at the airfields, and picked up. Outlandish as the idea was, the team leaders rejected it, and decided to trudge back on foot.
Each team was issued a set of two ¼” maps (scale: ¼” to a mile), and a picture of the respective airfield. The maps surveyed in 1909, obviously did not show the IB line, and the rail/road/tracks features, irrigation networks and population centres were drastically outdated. The airfield pictures were also 1958vintage with few worthwhile details. So with just a few hours remaining for emplaning, the teams hopelessly tried to make sense of the ‘intelligence info’ just received. The team leaders needed more time to explain the mission details to their men. At the PTS, there was mayhem as the riggers tried to complete the checks on 182 main and emergency sets of parachutes in blacked-out conditions. With mission preparations far from complete, the TOT was delayed by an hour to 0000 hours.
At 2330 hours, it was learnt that Pathankot had been attacked earlier in the evening by PAF Sabres, and all air and ground defences were on full alert. Matin, therefore, suggested that the Pathankot drop should be called off, but it was not agreed to by Dogar. Instead, it was summarily decided to carry out the air drops 3-4 miles away from the targets to avoid enemy AAA. Whether the PAF C-in-C was consulted on this matter remains moot.
Emplaning started at 0030 hours, and the three aircraft took off within the next fifteen minutes. After flying at low level for up to one-and-a-half hour, the C-130s were over their respective targets and by 0235 hours, all drops had been completed. At 0400 hours, Gp Capt Dogar informed Lt Col Matin that, “the para drops were complete, and that the team leaders had unanimously rejected the plan for retrieval by C-130s and would be exfiltrating on their own.
6
Pathankot Drop
On the morning of 7 September at 0235 hours, 64 commandos were dropped near the Pathankot Air Field from the two side doors of the C-130 in two ‘sticks’ of 32 each, at an altitude of 1,000 feet. On landing, the team leader, Major K G Butt, discovered that they had been dropped 8km south-west of the airfield, just next to a major canal which ran parallel to another one, 500 yards away. Apparently the major waterway was the Upper Bari Doab Canal, while the minor one was a later distributary not marked on the old map. The first casualty of the Pathankot assault was the team’s wireless operator who parachuted straight into a canal, and drowned along with his equipment. No contact could, thus, be established with Cherat, and the fate of the group members was known only after the POWs had been repatriated six months later.
Major Butt was able to regroup only 25 of his men, and started heading east towards the airfield through boggy terrain. Immediately after crossing a bridge over the first canal, they encountered Indian troops. Company Havaldar Major Abbas Ali, along with two of his mates, engaged the Indians so that the rest of the party could continue its advance. In the ensuing firefight, Havaldar Major Abbas Ali and Lance Naik Muzaffar Khan were killed, while Sepoy Shah Nawaz Khan was seriously wounded. (All three were awarded Tamgha-e-Jur’at). Butt’s party was able to cross the second canal, and carefully negotiated the crop fields which had started to fill up with farmers for the day’s work. The airfield was now a mere 1,000 yards away.
The Indian troops were in close pursuit, and seeing that no sanctuary was available for cover at the crack of dawn, Major Butt decided to head north-east towards Kangra Hills. Assaulting the next night after a well-rested day in the safety of crags and ravines, was considered a more sensible option. While heading towards the hills not far from Chaki River, Capt Bunyad’s party encountered enemy fire. A firefight ensued, but when the party found itself out of ammunition and completely surrounded by Indian troops, it was left with no option but to surrender. Major Butt’s party was also encircled by defending troops near Pathankot-Jalandhar Road, and after a two-hour firefight, it also had to surrender. (Major Khalid Gulrez Butt was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at.)
Seeing the mission headed nowhere, Capt Azad’s party decided to abort, and turned west to escape. The party was able to evade the Indians for four days, but was apprehended while crossing River Ravi just a few miles from the border. Only a party of fifteen men, led by Naib Subedar Muhammad Azam, was able to make it back to Pakistan from amongst the Pathankot group. Of the remaining men, 45 were captured (including six seriously wounded), and four were martyred.
Adampur Drop
At 0230 hours, 55 commandos for Adampur airfield were dropped in two sticks of 27 and 28, at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Most of the commandos discovered that they had landed in the midst of a village, in the vicinity of fields with tall crops. Barking of dogs gave away their presence immediately. While it took almost two hours to extract and regroup, the team leader Capt Durrani, managed to put together 49 men, and by 0415 hours they were ready to launch.
The airfield was about 3Km away, but shortly after the group started to move, it heard the noise of jet engines, signalling that aircraft were starting up for the day’s missions. By then it was first light, and soon the aircraft formations started to get airborne. Everyone ruefully wished that the para drops had occurred two hours earlier, so they could get on with the assault before daybreak. Capt Durrani decided to put off the operation for the following night, and broke up the group into smaller parties to hunker down for the day.
With an infantry company searching for the commandos, it was not long before they were completely surrounded by regular troops, police, armed villagers, and dogs. Fierce fighting took place and there were many casualties. In view of the enemy becoming fully alert, it was decided to abort the mission and all survivors were told to escape in small teams. The three officers (Captains Durrani, Ashraf and Ghulam Ahmed) were able to evade search parties for the next four days, living on nothing but raw corn cobs and sugar cane. After covering a distance of 80 Km their luck ran out, and they were apprehended just 22km short of the border while crossing River Sutlej. In all, 42 men were captured (including three seriously wounded), 12 were killed, and only one managed to escape.
Halwara Drop
The drop of 63 commandos at Halwara was done in a single stick, due to the non-availability of a second jump master on board the C-130. Just as at Adampur, the commandos landed in the midst of houses and fields with tall crops. Assembling the group was a problem, as no one was able to spot the signalman’s torchlight due to various high obstructions in the line of sight. Search parties of regular troops, and police in armoured cars and jeeps were all over the place; at dawn, light aircraft also joined in the search from the air. Most of commandos could not make it to the airfield, and got scattered while trying to evade the Indians. A few small parties were able to ambush troops from Punjab Armed Police, and muleteers from the animal transport company in Ludhiana, that had been hastily mustered. One commando party managed to blow up a bridge. Subedar Allah Ditta managed to lead his team almost to the boundary of the airfield, but was surrounded and a firefight ensued before the group ran out of ammunition; he was later awarded the Sitara-e-Jur’at for his brave leadership. In another encounter, Lance Naik Mukhtar Ahmed fought till the end when surrounded by one of the hunting parties. He was posthumously awarded the Tamgha-e-Jur’at.
Capt Hazoor Hasnain was able to regroup a team of six men, and headed for the airfield from where jet noise could be heard. Reaching the fourteen feet high airfield perimeter fence, they discovered to their dismay that the tightly woven wires could not be cut, as none of them were carrying any wire-cutters. After a while, a PAF bomber flew overhead and discharged its bomb load on the runway. The AAA opened up and the sky was lit all around. The air base was now fully alert, and it was daybreak. Hasnain decided to call off the mission, and the party of six prepared to escape.
Not long after they set course, Capt Hasnain’s party was surrounded by scores of highly charged villagers, but the commandos managed to escape after threatening to kill everyone and burn their village. Later, on several occasions they were spotted by search parties, but incredibly, they were able to give them the slip each time. After covering a circuitous route of 80 km on foot – travelling at night and resting in the fields during day – they came upon an Army jeep which they were able to commandeer, and drove the remaining 80Km to the Pakistani border, south of Kanganpur. Soon after they arrived at the Indian border check-post of Fattuwala for an ID check, their cover of ‘Indian commandos going on a mission to Pakistan’ was blown, but they were able to scamper away. The next thing they heard was a loud blast and saw their jeep blown to bits by the check-post guards, who thought it was still occupied. Once on the Pakistani side, they were accosted by a Pathan soldier at the check-post, “Olaka, tau sokay?” (Hey there, who are you?) Capt Hasnain declared that they were ‘Pakistani commandos coming back from a mission in India’. The guard commander, instantly ordered his men to hold fire, and welcomed the weary troops to their motherland. Capt Hasnain was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at. Besides Hasnain’s party of six which escaped, 53 men were captured (including four seriously injured), and four were martyred.
Consolidated losses from a total of 182 commandos were: 140 captured (including 13 seriously wounded), 20 killed and 22 escaped back.
Ambala Drop That Never Was
On 16 September, in the midst of a fierce war, HQ SSG received a flash message from GHQ ordering ‘Ghazi’ Company to undertake a para-commando assault against Ambala airfield, the same night. It was a baffling order, not only because the company had returned after operations in Kashmir just two days ago, but none of them had been trained for assault on an enemy airfield. Besides, the commandos had no experience of night jumps and had only done their basic para course; they were also in need of a refresher.
Pursuant to the GHQ order, Lt Col Ayub Afridi (Officer Commanding, 2 Commando Battalion), Major Naeem Shaikh (Company Commander, ‘Ghazi’ Company) and Major Ehsan-ul-Haq Dar (GSO-2 Ops), reached the Para Training School at 1100 hours for a coordination meeting with the PAF representative. Gp Capt Mukhtar Dogar arrived at 1500 hours, and straightaway went in for the briefing. He started by lauding the successful assault on the Indian airfields, “which had been completely destroyed by the SSG officers and men.”A surprised Major Naeem questioned Gp Capt Dogar if the PAF had the means to differentiate between damage caused by aerial bombing and ground action. When Gp Capt Dogar was unable to give a satisfactory reply, he was informed that for the last nine days, not even a beep had been heard from any of the wireless sets that the commando teams carried with them. BBC and All India Radio had reported that most of the commandos had been captured, and were POWs. In short, the mission that Gp Capt Dogar was lauding had actually been a complete disaster.
Moving to the upcoming Ambala assault, Gp Capt Dogar showed his audience an old photograph of Ambala airfield. Major Naeem objected to the obsolete photograph and demanded latest ones, with aircraft shelters and airfield defences properly marked. He also demanded photographs of at least two nearby drop zones. He then reminded Gp Capt Dogar that his men had not done a refresher para course, and also needed to carry out night jumps and learn group assembly techniques in darkness. These, Naeem insisted, were the minimum requirements to undertake the assault.
Irritated, Gp Capt Dogar remarked if that was the case, the task would require three months to complete. An equally exasperated Naeem replied that the task should then be postponed for three months. “Are you telling me that the mission cannot be launched tonight,” Gp Capt Dogar questioned Naeem. Naeem caustically replied that if the commandos were ordered to sit in the aircraft and launch, it would be done, but the mission success could not be guaranteed. With this, the briefing was called off and while departing, Gp Capt Dogar said that he would check with GHQ if the mission was on for the night.
The same evening, ‘Ghazi’ Company learnt that in view of Major Naeem’s reservations, the Pak Army C-in-C had agreed to call off the mission, much to the consternation of the PAF high command. It was no less embarrassing for the GHQ to have acceded to PAF’s request to start with, when the failure of the earlier missions was well known.
7
Some Professional Perspectives on the Operation
Brig Zahir Alam Khan, a former SSG battalion commander states in his book, The Way it Was, “The HQ SSG had carried out no preliminary planning for these operations, no intelligence had been gathered, no maps and air photos had been collected, and no troops had been earmarked and trained. Lt Col Matin, Punjab Regiment, who had not served in the SSG but had been selected as a SSG battalion commander, was the officiating commander of the SSG on 6 September. The orders came without any warning, and caught the SSG without any plans and troops earmarked for the operation. The officiating SSG commander and the GSO-2 (Operations), Major Dar, Punjab Regiment,, who had also not served with the SSG but was made responsible for operational planning and supervision of the launching of operations.” In a scathing final comment, Brig Zahir Alam goes on to say, “The whole operation was a disaster due to bad planning, bad launching of operation, and above all, the lack of moral courage to refuse a badly organised operation.”
Brig Shamim Yasin Manto, was a former GSO-2 (Ops) at SSG HQ, and President of the Court of Inquiry constituted for debriefing the repatriated para-commando POWs. He was of the opinion that GHQ must equally share the blame for the fiasco, alongside the SSG officers. He also believed that despite a four-month prior notification, the mission details were provided only a few hours before the actual launch, hence the preparations were shoddy. Secrecy had been stretched to such an extent that instead of surprising the enemy, own troops stood stunned.
Another observation of Brig Manto was that there was no oversight of the preparations and training of personnel by a higher authority (in case of the SSG, at that time it was the CGS ); this was unlike other subordinate formations which were under constant scrutiny of Corps and Divisional Commanders. Brig Manto addressed another significant operational aspect that was found wanting. This was the need for ‘pathfinders’ who should have been para-dropped or infiltrated a night or two prior, to radio back suitable drop zones near the three airfields, and away from population centres. Finally, he felt that if there had been a bold SSG Commander, he would have refused to undertake a mission that was practically ordered at a twelve-hour notice, with no preparation and with perfunctory target details.
The late Maj Gen Faisal Alvi, a former GOC SSG, has been more charitable towards his outfit regarding the failed para drop operation. “The airfield drop was PAF’s plan and the Army simply went along with it. It should be remembered that at that time the SSG was a nascent and inexperienced organisation. In such circumstances, it was not unusual for strong motivation and intense enthusiasm to have taken the better of good sense.”
After Thoughts
The para-commando assault on airfields was, in all likelihood, originally conceived as a contingency operation. Apparently, as discussions between AHQ and GHQ progressed, the commando operation morphed into an opening gambit of major proportions, to be conducted soon after PAF’s pre-emptive air strikes. The assault made no sense, since PAF’s air strikes promised to be far more effective, could deliver vastly more firepower, and were less risky in terms of human lives.
As far as the mission objectives are concerned, it seems that there was muddled thinking at the AHQ about utilization of the commandos, for mopping up a half-hearted PAF’s air strikes earlier in the evening. A better option would have been to earmark the nearby Pathankot for the commandos, while the PAF tackled the relatively distant Adampur and Halwara with its Sabres.
The AHQ had also left a number of issues unresolved during the planning stage. For instance, the idea of exfiltration by C-130s landing on the just bombarded airfields defied common sense, but either the PAF C-in-C remained unaware of this plan, or had rashly approved it. Similarly AHQ, which should have known better about air intelligence matters, failed to inform GHQ about its stock of outdated maps and airfield photographs in advance, so that the latter could have tapped its own resources, if any. Finally, AHQ should have notified GHQ at an early stage – at least by 1 September, when Operation ‘Grand Slam’ was launched and retaliation by India expected – that warning for the impending para-commando assault was not going to be more than 24 hours. That would have kept the SSG commanders on their toes, and would not have caught them by surprise, as it happened.
At GHQ, the CGS to whom the SSG reported in the chain of command, was too busy in preparations and supervision of Operations ‘Gibraltar’ and ‘Grand Slam’. It appears that the para-commando operation got relegated in importance and – was subjected to gross negligence in the preparatory stage. Least attention had been paid to the most critical phases of the operation, viz infiltration and exfiltration. It seems that nobody at GHQ thought that the mission would actually have to be executed one day. Now Pakistan has a Army Strategic Forces Command to handle all this.
Even the matter regarding secrecy of the mission had been taken to ludicrous limits by both service headquarters, and it had harmfully impinged on the preparations for the very dangerous and demanding mission.
XXX
PS—— “SF has to fight on two fronts. One is the LTTE and the other is the Indian Army “. These words were uttered by the First Commander of the Ad Hoc HQ Special Forces, to me, his sole Staff Officer, one sultry afternoon at Pallaly, Jaffna, just a few days before being “ Kicked Upstairs “ to GHQ ……How true for SF everywhere.
References:
Haider Mehdi’s Perspective — The Passing Away of A Great Warrior
Politics of Surrender and the Conspiracy of Silence by S G Mehdi
The Way it Was by Brig Z.A. Khān
Flight of the Falcon by S S Haider
