By
Colonel Awadhesh Kumar, Special Forces
With INS ARIHANT completing its first operational patrol, India achieved its immediate aim of strengthening its deterrence against China. This deterrence was already in place with Combat aircrafts capable of nuclear bombing and deployment of land based Agni Series of nuclear missiles. With ARIHANT came the third leg of the deterrence ie the sea leg. The deterrence against ALL will be complete once we have a few Regiments of land based ICBMs with 15000 Km range and SLBMs with similar range on minimum of three nuclear powered Submarines on operational patrol at all times.
China with 8 x SSBNs of its own quietly noted this development without making comments. As Usual the Pakis along with a few defence analysts with similar views talked of provocation. Even being fully aware that for them 350 Km Prithvi missiles and 1000km Agni 1 missiles are more than enough, Pakistan talked of “cost-effective options” to maintain strategic stability. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry claimed, “no one should be in doubt about Pakistan’s resolve and capabilities to meet the challenges posed by the latest developments both in the nuclear and conventional realms in South Asia.” The Indian response gave them further well deserved nightmare with some Important Indian officials even calling for elimination of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons through preemptive use of nuclear and conventional forces. Pakistan should better learn to shut up or face the consequences.
Deployment of a SSBN is certainly a triumph for India even when presently the sub has just modest capabilities because apart from adding to India’s second strike capabilities, it now also provides an assured second-strike capability — notwithstanding earlier availability of road/rail mobile cannisterized nuclear missiles. In the next two to three years India will have at least
3x SSBN fleet carrying SLBMs with 5000km range. INS VARSHA at Rambilli is being readied to provide all logistic support to the SSBNs.This will ensure operational deployment of at least two nuke subs at all times, providing full deterrence with respect to China and lots of deterrence with respect to any other adventurers too.
Whatever a few analysts may try and make out, there is no nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. It will be a financial suicide for a Pakistan if they try it. Just like North Korea being a big irritant to US, so is Pakistan to India. This must be understood by all. Coming to China again there is no competition between India and China. Even while China may try and match the American nuclear arsenal, India will not try and match China with missile to missiles numbers. We know how to calculate the minimum requirement which will cause unacceptable damage to China or any other adversary. Our land based nuclear arsenal should also be able to provide a credible post strike retaliation response against any first strike on us. This will be more than enough to prevent any nuclear blackmail or even a limited nuclear attack in conjunction with a Conventional one. The assured sea based second strike capability in fact will be in addition to above land based minimum. So there is simply no security dilemma as it existed between the USA and the Soviets.
To increase stability, India has publicly reaffirmed its policy of no first use and adopt a retaliation-only nuclear posture against all those nuclear nations who have this NFU policy. However in case of Pakistan turning into a rogue nuclear nation, it may invite a pre emptive strike or a massive second strike for total decapitation. All who claim to be friends of Pakistan must drill this fact into the minds of both the Pakistani military and Civil leadership. There is no GOLDILOCKS DILEMA for India with respect to India.
India may have nuclear dialogue with China but not with Pakistan. Yes, if all agree then there can be a joint conference where India, Iran, US, Russia, China and North Korea can all sit down and have a nice chat.
Indra Gandhi had both surprised and trumped the big powers of the time with a so called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974. Thereafter initially political situation at home prevented any weaponisation. After 1980, She rightly put her weight behind the IGMDP (integrated missile development programme). Otherwise nuclear weaponisation sans missile would have been useless only inviting coercive economic sanctions and unbearable international pressure. Though even then no one would have dared military coercion against Indian nuclear build up. On the other hand a direct Surgical Strike against Kahuta Nuclear plant in Pakistan was contemplated by India (Ravi Rikhey’s book the Fourth Round is quite plausible).
Simultaneously work began on the nuclear reactor for our own nuclear SSBNs and SSGNs. To gain operating experience we even leased INS CHAKRA, a nuclear powered SSGN from the Russians. By 1989 we had the Prithvi deployed and Agni 1 tested. The weaponisation ambiguity continued as a deliberate strategy, while we waited for Agni 3 and our own SSBN with a SLBM. However the issue got forced in 1998 and India once again carried out nuclear tests and a thermo nuclear test too. This time it was testing of weapons with apology to none. Rest is history.
Coming to 2018, now we are proceeding ahead with deployment of Agni V a 8000km ICBM and working on the 12000 Km Agni VII ( Agni VI is likely to be the MIRVs ) and soon to be deployed 5000 Km SLBM. The ARIHANT is deployed and ARIGHAT and ARDHIMAN should be following soon. By 2025, there should be a few more SSBNs with missiles having full intercontinental ranges. Around that time our own SSGNs should also start joining the Navy. Ultimate aim should be to have 12 SSBNs for deployment in Bay of Bengal, Lakshadweep Sea, and the Southern Indian Ocean for carrying out a Second Strike on any Country which carries out a nuclear strike on India.These subs will function under the Command and Control of not the Regional Naval Commands or their respective Fleets but under the Strategic Forces Command just like the ARIHANT.
For naval battles and fleet support and for prowling the Indian Ocean and other Oceans as need arises, our own SSGNs should start joining the INS CHAKRA in 2025 onwards. Ultimately aim should be to have 24 of them giving support to our Western, Eastern,Andaman and Southern fleets. Conventional diesel subs will be in addition. After the arrival of ARIHANT from its first operational patrol the Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphatically declared India’s nuclear triad as complete. India now has an underwater nuclear launch capability with full technical safety and a robust Command and Control system in place in the form of Strategic Forces Command.with a clear Military Chain of Command PM …..Chairman Chief of Staff Committee ….C-in-C Strategic Forces Command ….Captain SSBNs.
India is always ready to eliminate its nuclear weapons, provided ALL nuclear powers do the same.
Arihant’s historical evolution also leaves doubts about its robustness and reliability. There are more than a few rumblings within Indian Navy circles regarding reactor designs based on second-generation Soviet submarines. Arihant’s first deterrent patrol lasted merely 20 days, suggesting endurance issues with its nuclear propulsion package. Finally, the Indian Navy would have to develop very robust infrastructure for training, maintenance, and repair of its SSBN fleet before the sea-based deterrent could be realized. In fact, the fleet has recently suffered from a series of accidents, including the 2017 mishap onboard Arihant. Only extensive operational experience will build the required confidence both in the men and the machine.
Given the twists and turns of its nuclear submarine program, the resulting technological limits, and the underlying problems with Soviet legacy platforms, Arihant’s first deterrent patrol is just a modest beginning in India’s effort to deploy a credible nuclear triad. For the prospective future, its nuclear deterrent will continue to rely on the land- and air-based legs. Indian decision-makers must accept the reality of this modest enterprise. Rather than engaging in premature triumphalism over Arihant, India should take a page from the Chinese playbook to hide its capacities and bide its time.
Operationalizing Deterrence at Sea
Even though Arihant, in its current form, has limited utility against China, its operationalization has nonetheless raised serious questions about how India would deploy its nuclear submarine force, whether this will entail a “ready-to-use” arsenal, and whether India has developed a sufficiently elaborate command and control mechanism to avoid unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Such alarmist reactions, however, do not fully capture the efforts India’s Strategic Forces Command has made in establishing operational protocols for its SSBNs. The command’s standard operating procedures for the nuclear triad alleviate three major concerns. First, a sea-based deterrent would not engage in conventional operations, nor does it automatically translate into a “ready-to-use” arsenal. Second, custody of India’s nuclear weapons has not necessarily been delegated to the military. Last, India’s political leadership will maintain firm control over nuclear assets.
Relatedly, the operationalization of Arihant does not mean India’s nuclear weapons are now on hair-trigger alert. It is highly unlikely that the submarines will carry a nuclear payload during peacetime. In fact, insofar as India’s SSBN force will not perform constant patrols armed with nuclear weapons at all times, it does not entirely fit the definition of a true triad. India’s operational plans for its nuclear submarines consist of a three-stage process. The first is nuclear alerting, or mechanically mating missile launch tubes with missile canisters armed with nuclear weapons at specialized naval facilities. This would start at the first indications of a crisis situation (Strategic Forces Command defines a crisis not as the start of actual conflict, but any scenario where Indian decision-makers foresee a possibility of military escalation with Pakistan or China). The second stage involves dispersing the submarines on deterrence patrol. It is only after the boats receive political authorization that they will maneuver to predetermined positions to prepare for the eventual launch of nuclear weapons. This strategy does entail a risk of a “bolt from the blue” nuclear strike against India’s major naval bases, but decision-makers are willing to run this risk given the other legs of the nuclear triad and the inherent uncertainty that any first strike would eliminate all its nuclear assets. Since at least 2008, Strategic Forces Command has consistently strived to develop and put into practice such operational plans for India’s SSBN force.
